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Abstract
At Crypto 96 Cramer and Damga˚rd proposed an efficient, tree-based, signature scheme that is provably secure against adaptive
chosen message attacks under the assumption that inverting RSA is computationally infeasible.
In this paper we show how to modify their basic construction in order to achieve a scheme that is provably secure under the
assumption that factoring large composites of a certain form is hard. Our scheme is as efficient as the original Cramer Damga˚rd
solution while relying on a seemingly weaker intractability assumption.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Digital Signatures are one of the most important primitives of public-key cryptography [13]. Using digital
signatures the receiver of a message can be assured that the message originated from a specific sender, and even
more importantly, she will be able to prove such thing to a third party (non-repudiation). Because of the centrality of
this concept it is very important to find signature schemes which are provably secure and efficient.
The concept of provable security for signature schemes (i.e. forgery should be equivalent to the solution of a well-
defined conjectured hard problem) was formalized in the seminal paper by Goldwasser et al. [18] where an exact
definition of what “forgery” means is given.
Starting from the scheme described in [18], several other provably secure signature schemes have been proposed
in the literature that follows their paradigm. An important line of research has been to try to identify the minimal
assumption needed to construct provably secure signature schemes. The assumption used in [18] was the existence of
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trapdoor claw-free permutations. Later, Bellare and Micali [2] showed that any trapdoor permutation would suffice.
A breakthrough result came with Naor and Yung [22] who showed that it is possible to construct provably secure
signatures out of one-way permutations, disposing of the trapdoor assumption that was considered essential. Finally
Rompel [28] relaxed the assumption to the mere existence of one-way functions (which is easily seen to be the minimal
assumption required).
However, the schemes mentioned above fall short in terms of their efficiency (which is measured as of computing
time needed to produce and verify signatures and as of signature length). For example the original scheme in [18]
builds a binary tree of height d , and the signature length and the computing time is O(d). The parameter d is chosen
so that 2d is larger than the number of messages that the signer will ever sign.
It is thus important to research, if using the properties of specific number-theoretic problems (such as Factoring,
RSA or Discrete Log), it is possible to devise provably secure yet efficient signature schemes.
For the case of the RSA function, Dwork and Naor [14] proposed such a scheme, which was later improved by
Cramer and Damga˚rd [10]. The idea proposed in [14,10] is to use specific properties of the RSA function to modify
the original scheme in [18] to work with a “flat” tree, i.e. a tree with a large branching factor l > 2. In the [14,10]
schemes, computation time and signature length remain at O(d) but now d is much smaller because all we need is
that ld is larger than the total number of signed messages.
At the same time Cramer [8] extended the basic GMR [18] technique to work with a flat-tree. The resulting scheme
allows signatures that are somewhat shorter than GMR to be obtained. This however comes at the cost of requiring
much larger keys and public parameters: for example the signer is required to keep l + 1 different ’trapdoors’ and
users of the scheme must agree on a common list of l random numbers (the latter is required also in [14]). In particular
this means that the private storage for the signer is larger by a factor of l with respect to [14,10]. The computational
efficiency of Cramer’s scheme [8] is comparable to [18], which is less efficient than [10].
Thus from a purely computational point of view (i.e. regardless of the assumption used), the method presented in
[10] is more desirable since it uses less time and space. The open question, then, is to see if one can achieve the same
efficiency as [10], but relying on a factoring assumption.
OUR CONTRIBUTION. In this paper we give a positive answer to this question, by showing how to construct an
efficient flat-tree signature scheme whose security is based on the assumption that factoring large RSA moduli of
a special form is hard. The restriction on the moduli N is that we require that the product of the smallest l primes
divides φ(N ). This restriction does not seem to affect the security of the factoring assumption, nor does it seem to
make finding these moduli any harder (see Section 6).
Some components of our scheme (particularly the basic authentication step) are identical to those proposed by
Cramer and Damga˚rd in [10]. The security reduction to factoring is achieved by changing the key generation protocol
and the choice of the public parameters. Because the basic authentication step remains the same, however, the
efficiency of our scheme is more or less equivalent to the efficiency of the scheme proposed in [10], while relying
on a seemingly weaker assumption.
1.1. Other related work
In addition to the works already mentioned in the Introduction, we point out that efficient provably secure signature
schemes have been proposed using a variation on the RSA assumption. These works [17,11,16] present efficient,
state-free (all the above schemes, including ours, require the signer to keep some state) signatures based on a stronger
assumption on the inversion of the RSA function. Although these schemes are more efficient than ours, we stress
that our goal was to prove the security of a reasonably efficient signature scheme based on the weakest factoring-
based possible assumption. Even though, strictly speaking, our specific assumption is not known to subsume both
the regular and the strong RSA assumption, we make the point that, for an appropriate choice of parameter (see
Section 6), all the efficient factoring methods known do not seem to gain any advantage from the side information
we need to disclose about λ(N ). Other efficient signature schemes were recently proposed by Boneh et al. [5] and
by Boneh and Boyen [4]. The former result shows how to construct a flat-tree signature scheme provably secure
under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Boneh and Boyen, on the other hand, put forward an efficient,
stateless, signature scheme provably secure under a rather non-standard assumption, namely the strong Diffie–Hellman
assumption (the reader is referred to [4] for more details about this assumption). Another (stateless) signature scheme
from bilinear maps was presented by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [6].
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A different approach followed in the literature is to try to prove “as much as possible” the security of efficient
signature schemes such as traditional RSA [27], Rabin [26] and schemes of the ElGamal family [15]. Starting from
the work of Bellare and Rogaway [3] several papers (such as [25]) proved that these schemes are secure (according to
the [18] definition) in an idealized model of computation where a random oracle (informally, an oracle that implements
a random function) is available to all parties. Although a proof in the random oracle model is better than no proof at
all, it should not be automatically considered as a proof of security in the real model of computation. Indeed this is not
the case, as proven in a result by Canetti et al. [7]. Since our scheme does not use a random oracle, we do not further
discuss the random oracle model in this paper.
Finally some of the number-theoretic ideas in this paper (specifically the idea to use exponents that divide φ(N ))
has been used before in a paper by Ohta and Okamoto, in order to improve the efficiency of Fiat-Shamir-type
identification schemes [23].
2. Definitions and notations
We start with some definitions and notations. Given a probability space C we indicate with x ← C the algorithm
which assigns to x a random element according to C . In the case in which C is a finite set, x ← C indicates the
algorithm which assigns to x a random (uniformly chosen) element of C .
We say that a function (·) is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0 there exists an integer kc such that for all k > kc
(k) < k−c.
In the rest of the paper we assume that N is an n-bit composite modulus obtained as the product of two Blum
primes p and q (i.e. p and q are such that p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4). We denote such moduli as Blum moduli. We denote
with λ(N ) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). It is well known that for all x ∈ Z∗N we have that xλ(N ) = 1 mod N .
Consider now l (small) odd primes ρ1, . . . , ρl and let σ be their product. We are going to consider Blum
moduli N , such that ∀ i ρi is a divisor of λ(N ), but ρ2i is not, and moreover N >> σ 4. Let us denote then with
BLUM(k, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρl) the set of such Blum moduli with the property that λ(N )/σ is of length k, i.e.
BLUM(k, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρl) = {N = pq : p, q ≡ 3 mod 4 ,
ρi |λ(N ) , ρ2i 6 |λ(N ) , |λ(N )/(ρ1 · · · ρl)| = k}.
In the following we will assume that factoring such integers is hard even when given knowledge of the product σ of
the small primes that divides λ(N ).
Assumption 1 (Factoring). For every polynomial-time algorithm A, and for every set of small primes ρ1, . . . , ρl ,
the following probability is negligible in k:
Pr
[
N ← BLUM(k, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρl) ,
A(N , ρ1, . . . , ρl) = (p, q) : N = pq
]
.
Definition 1 (e-Residues). Let N be a composite integer obtained as the product of two primes p and q and let e be
a divisor of λ(N ), we say that an element x ∈ Z∗N is said to be an e-residue modulo N if there exists another element
y ∈ Z∗N , such that
x = ye mod N .
FAMILIES OF HASH FUNCTIONS. We consider families of hash functions mapping strings of arbitrary length to
strings of fixed length. Namely we consider a family H = {Hk}k where each Hk is a collection of functions of the
form H : {0, 1}∗→ {0, 1}k for some integer k.Hk is polynomially samplable. We will be interested in hash functions
that are collision intractable. A family H of hash functions is said to be collision intractable if it is infeasible to find
two different inputs that map to the same output for a randomly chosen member of the family.
Definition 2 (Collision Intractability [12]). We say that H is collision intractable if, for every probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A there exists a negligible function (·) such that
Pr[H ← Hk; A(H) = (x1, x2) s.t. x1 6= x2 and H(x1) = H(x2)] ≤ (k).
We now define digital signatures.
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Definition 3 (Digital Signatures). Let k be a security parameter, we define a digital signature as the triplet
(G,SIG,VER), where
• G is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input 1k outputs a pair (PK, SK) of matching public and
secret keys.
• SIG is the signing algorithm. It takes as input a message m, the keys PK, SK and possibly keeps some internal
state. It produces as output a signature σ for m. This algorithm can be probabilistic.
• VER is the verification algorithm. It receives as input a message m, the public key PK and a signature σ , and
checks if σ is valid according to m and PK. In other words VER(m,PK, σ ) = 1 if σ = SIG(m,PK, SK).
The strongest notion of security for signature schemes was given by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [18].
Definition 4 (Secure Signatures). A signature scheme (G,SIG,VER) is existentially unforgeable against an
adaptive chosen message attack if it is computationally infeasible for a forger, who knows just the public key, to
produce a valid signature σ on a message m even after having obtained polynomially many signatures on messages
mi of his choice from the signer.
More formally, for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F , there exists a negligible function (·) such
that
Pr

(PK, SK)← G(1k)
for i = 1 . . . n
mi ← F(PK,m1, σ1, . . . ,mi−1, σi−1)
σi ← SIG(mi ,PK, SK)
(m, σ )← F(PK,m1, σ1, . . .mn, σn);
m 6= mi for i = 1 . . . n, and VER(m,PK, σ ) = 1
 ≤ (k).
3. The new scheme
Our scheme will make use of an l-ary tree (i.e. with branching degree l), which we call the signature tree. The root
of the tree will be a random value S included in the public key of the signer. The tree has depth d+1 with a branching
degree of l in the first d levels and a branching degree of 1 in the last level. By this setting we will allow the signer to
sign up to ld messages (we are going to assume ld to be polynomial in k the security parameter). We now introduce
some terminology: The first d levels of the tree are denoted as expanding levels, since every parent node S j at level
j ( j ∈ {1, . . . , d}) has l children (we have the root as S0 = S). We call these nodes expanding nodes. The remaining
level, level d + 1, is called, the terminal level. Every parent node belonging to this level has exactly one child. The
parent nodes at the terminal level are denoted as terminal nodes. As usual, each terminal node’s only child is called
a leaf of the tree. We call an item a parent together with all his children and an arc a parent with one of his children.
This means that every item has l arc. A path from a node A to a node B is the sequence of arcs that connects A with
B.
Informally the signature algorithm will start “filling up” this tree. To sign the i th message mi , the signer will place
mi as the i th leaf and will output an authentication chain that links mi to the root of the tree (which is part of the
public key). The verifier, will follow this authentication chain and if the end result matches the value in the public
key, accepts the signature. More precisely, the tree is constructed in a depth first fashion. This means that the signer
uses a DFS algorithm that gradually constructs a full l-ary tree of depth d, by selecting at random (in the appropriate
subgroup of Z∗N ) the nodes. The algorithm DFS receives on input an index i = 1, . . . , ld , together with all the relevant
parameters (namely l, d, the modulus N , a set of public verification exponents and the root S). Next, it creates a path
to a new Sid value and outputs the produced path (i1, . . . , id) together with all the values Sik (k = 1, . . . , d). In Fig. 1
is represented the generation of the i th signature, (where, we stress, mi is the signed message). Formal details follow.
KEY GENERATION. The signer chooses l odd distinct primes2 ρi < 2v (for some small enough parameter v) and sets
pˆ = ∏l/2i=1 ρi , qˆ = ∏li=l/2+1 ρi and σ = pˆqˆ . He then randomly picks two (distinct) large primes p′ and q ′ of length
2 The choice of these primes needs not satisfy any special requirement except, of course, that this choice must guarantee that factoring the
modulus remains hard (see Section 6 for a discussion about this). For efficiency reason these primes could be chosen as the first l odd primes.
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Fig. 1. Signing the i th message mi . Labeled and black circles indicate nodes already visited by the DFS algorithm.
k/2 such that p = 2p′ pˆ + 1 and q = 2q ′qˆ + 1 are two (k + ω)/2-bit primes (for some parameter ω that depends on
v and l). Then he sets N = pq as the public modulus.
Note that by this position we have N as a Blum integer such that ρi (but not ρ2i ) divides λ(N ), and of the appropriate
length. Note also that 2 (but not 22 = 4) divides λ(N ).
Denote with E = 2σ = 2ρ1 · · · ρl . The signer chooses uniformly and at random two E th residues h, S in Z∗N and a
function H from a family of collision intractable hash functions. We will assume that H outputs a value in {0, 1}`, for
some security parameter ` < k/2. For technical reasons, that will become apparent in the proof of security, the signer
sets e = 2`+1 and for each i = 1, . . . , l sets ei = ρ`ii , where `i is the minimum integer such that ei > 2`. The signer
publishes (N , h, S, e, e1, . . . , el , H, d), where d represents the depth of the tree, as his public key and keeps private
the factorization of the modulus. Note that this allows the signer to sign up to ld messages.
Remark 1. The key generation algorithm is very similar to that proposed by Naccache and Stern in [21]. They showed
that the extra requirement on the choice of p, q in practice slows down the generation of N by around 9% with respect
to the generation of a regular RSA modulus (see [21] for more details).
SIGNATURE ALGORITHM. The signer holds a tree of depth d with root S. All the nodes in the tree at the beginning
are empty.
To sign the i th message mi the signer proceeds as follows:
1. He visits the path on the tree from the root to the i th leaf, which is labeled with mi . If a node j on this path has not
been visited before, the signer labels it with a random E-residue S j .
2. Let (S, i1, Si1 , . . . , id , Sid ) be the visited path (where each i j is an index in {1, . . . , l}). Then he solves (for yik ,
where k = 1, . . . , d) the following equations
y
ei1
i1
= S · hH(Si1 ) mod N
and for all j = 2, . . . , d
y
ei j
i j = Si j−1 · h
H(Si j ) mod N .
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To conclude the signature he computes a zi such that
zei = Sid · hH(mi ) mod N .
3. The output signature on mi is sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id).
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION. The receiver, given a message m, the public key (N , h, S, e, e1, . . . , el , H, d) and a
purported signature sig(m) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id), computes the following
Sid = zei · h−H(mi ) mod N
followed by
Si j−1 = y
ei j
i j · h
−H(Si j ) mod N
for all j = d downto 1.
If the final value S0 ≡ S mod N the signature is accepted as valid.
Remark 2. Note that even though we perform iterated root extractions during the signing procedure, we just need
to assume that h and the S j ’s above are E th residues to make the above procedure work. Indeed, given that
gcd(ei , λ(N )) = ρi , we can find αi , βi such that αiei + βiλ(N ) = ρi . This means that, in order to compute the
ei = ρ`ii th root of an E-residue x , the signer should first compute 1 = xαi which by the above GCD computation is
an ei -root of xρi and then compute a ρi -root of 1. A similar argument holds for e-roots.
Now let1 be an E-residue and let δi one of its ρi -roots, i.e. δ
ρi
i = 1 mod N . In general the value δi can be computed
in O(ρi ) time if we know the factorization of N (cf. [1]). Note that this is not a problem if one assumes that the
primes ρi are all very small. However, if one wants to use slightly larger primes, the O(ρi ) solution may become too
inefficient. In the Appendix we show a method to extract ρi -roots at the cost of a single modular exponentiation in
Z∗N .
The security of the scheme is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds and H is a collision resistant hash function, then the digital signature scheme
presented above is secure against an adaptive chosen message attack.
Remark 3. Our presentation of the scheme, and consequently the theorem statement, assumes the existence of
collision-resistant hash functions. Moreover, using techniques similar to those presented in [10], one can completely
dispense with the hash function H in our scheme. This solution would, however, be much more expensive than using a
hash function based on symmetric techniques. For simplicity, we decided to present the scheme this way, as we believe
it is also conceptually clearer to “separate” the role of the hash function from the number-theoretic authentication step.
In Section 8 we will show how to adapt the techniques in [10] to our scheme to avoid using H altogether.
The complete proof appears in Section 5. Before describing it in detail, however, we present (in the next section)
two very simple lemmas that, it transpires, are very useful tools to prove our theorem.
4. Two simple lemmas
The following two lemmas are invoked during the proof of security of the signature scheme.
Lemma 1. Let N = pq be the product of two primes. Let e be a divisor of λ(N ) with multiplicity one (i.e. e2 does
not divide λ(N )) such that e divides either p − 1 or q − 1 but not both of them. Then every eth residue has exactly e
different eth roots.
Proof. It is a well-known fact from number theory [19] that in every finite cyclic group G, the equation xd = a
has gcd(d, ord(G)) different solutions. This fact, however, cannot be immediately applied to Z∗N because it is not
a cyclic group, but can be applied to the cyclic groups Z∗q and Z∗p having order, respectively, φ(q) = (q − 1) and
φ(p) = (p − 1) (see [19] for details).
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Without loss of generality assume that e divides p−1 but does not divide q−1. Now from the equation y = xe mod N ,
we derive the equations
y = xe mod p (1)
and
y = xe mod q. (2)
Eq. 1, then, has gcd(e, (p−1)) = e different solutions and Eq. 2 has gcd(e, (q−1)) = 1 different solutions. Using
the Chinese Remainder Theorem [19], these can be combined to yield e different solutions modulo N .
Lemma 2. Let N = pq be the product of two primes. Let e be a divisor of p − 1 (resp. q − 1) but not a divisor of
q − 1 (resp. p− 1) with multiplicity one. Let a be an e-residue in Z∗N and y1, y2 two distinct solutions of the equation
xe = a mod N. Then there is an efficient algorithm that on input y1 and y2 returns the factorization of N .
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that e divides p−1. Since the equation xe = a mod q has only one solution,
it must be the case that
y1 ≡ y2 mod q. (3)
On the other hand since y1 6= y2 mod N it has to be the case that
y1 6≡ y2 mod p. (4)
Eq. 3 tells us that y1 − y2 ≡ 0 mod q and thus, since y1, y2 < N , gcd(y1 − y2, N ) is a non-trivial factor of N .
The two lemmas above have the following consequence. Assume to have an algorithm A that on input N , e and an
eth residue y outputs an eth root of y. From the lemmas above it is immediate to see that is then possible to construct
a different algorithm B, having black box access to A, that factors the modulus with probability 1− 1/e (just feed A
with y = xe mod N , where x is chosen randomly, and with probability 1− 1/e A will return a root different than x).
5. Proof of security
We start with a simple observation that is going to be very useful in the remainder of this proof. Let RESN (e) be
the subgroup of eth residues in Z∗N . Note that, by the choice of the moduli we are considering in this theorem, if e
divides λ(N ) but e2 does not, then raising an eth residue to the e is a permutation in RESN (e).
The proof goes by reductio ad absurdum. We assume that the proposed scheme is not secure, meaning that there
exists an adversary A that can forge signatures with some non-negligible probability . Then we prove that if such an
adversary exists, it is possible to construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B (a simulator) that, using A as
an oracle, can factor with non- negligible probability, thus contradicting the hypothesis of the theorem.
If we assume that suchA exists, then his interaction with the signer would be as follows. FirstA obtains the public
key. Then for i = 1, . . . , t (where t is the maximum number of signatures the adversary is allowed to ask) he asks
for the signature on a message mi and receives in return a valid signature Sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id). Then he
will output m 6= mi and a valid signature Sig(m j ) = (z j , y j1 , j1, . . . , y jd , jd) on it.
We argue that the public key and the verification tests on a valid signature imply that the forged signature must
satisfy one of the following (mutually exclusive) conditions (where with Si0 we denote S the root of the tree contained
in the public key):
Type I For some 1 ≤ i ≤ t , one has that y jk = yik for each k = 1, . . . , d, Sid = S jd , but z j 6= zi .
Type II For some 1 ≤ i ≤ t , there exist an index 1 ≤ k′ < d such that for all k ≤ k′, y jk = yik , Sik′ = S jk′ but
y jk′+1 6= yik′+1 .
If there is a forger that succeeds with non-negligible probability, then there must be a forger that can successfully
produce either a Type I forgery, or a Type II forgery with non- negligible probability.
In the remainder of the proof we will distinguish two cases, depending on the type of expected forgery. Since these
two cases are exhaustive, one of them must happen with probability of at least /2.
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Forgery of type I. The algorithm B (the simulator) is given as input a Blum modulus N of the appropriate form
together with a set of l small primes (ρ1, . . . ρl ) such that for every ρi one has that ρi |λ(N ) but ρ2i 6 |λ(N ). We want
to show how B can use the forgery received from A to factor N . Let t be the maximum number of sign-queries the
adversary is allowed to ask (for simplicity we will assume that A will ask exactly t queries). The simulator generates
his public key as follows. First it generates the public exponents e, e1, . . . el as a real signer would do. Next, it sets
F = 2 · e1 · · · el , chooses α, β uniformly and at random in Z∗N and sets h = αF mod N and S = βF mod N . Note
that we can take ei -roots of h, S (for any i) but not e-roots (since e = 2`+1).
All the internal nodes, except those of depth d are computed in a similar way. The simulator sets Sk = x Fk mod N
(where, once again, the xk’s are chosen randomly in Z∗N ) and stores the xk’s for future usage. Observe that all the
nodes generated this way – as well as S and h – are random E-residues in Z∗N , so they are distributed exactly as in the
real signing process (more details below).
The simulator can generate valid signatures as follows. To sign the i th message mi , it chooses zi at random in Z∗N
and sets
Sid = zei h−H(mi ) mod N .
All the remaining relations can be easily computed as follows. For the first index i1 in the path of the signature it
sets
yi1 = βF/ei1 (αF/eik )H(Si1 ) mod N
while for each index ik , with k = 2, . . . , d , the simulator sets
yik = x
F/eik
ik−1 (α
F/eik )H(Sik ) mod N .
Finally it outputs the signature
Sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id).
Observe that the signatures produced by the simulator are perfectly indistinguishable with respect to the signatures
a real signer would generate. As a matter of fact the only difference between a real signature and a simulated one is
the following. In the first case all the nodes of the tree – as well as the root S and the public value h – are E-residues
(recall that E = 2 · ρ1 · · · ρl ), whereas in the simulation they are F-residues (with F = 2 · e1 · · · el ). However,
since ei = ρ`ii (for each index i = 1, . . . , l) and N is a Blum modulus, every ρi th residue is also an ρ`ii power.
Consequently any E-residue is also an F-residue. In other words, by our definition of F , in the simulation, we have
that RESN (E) = RESN (F). Moreover, note that, according to the simulation method described so far, the value α
is never revealed to the adversary. In the terminal levels the (simulated) authentication procedure does not involve
any e-root extraction. On the other hand, in the expanding levels, the authentication method requires the simulator to
extract ei -roots, but it is always the case that ei 6= e. Note that the above reasoning implies that the actual value of
α is never explicitly revealed to the adversary. At first, one may object that a sufficiently powerful adversary might
always factor N and thus be able to extract all the F roots of h. This strategy, however, would allow A to guess the
exact α originally chosen by the simulator only with probability at most 1/F (note that, for the class of moduli we
are considering in this proof, any F residue has exactly F different F-roots — see Lemma 1 for a proof of this fact).
However, such a powerful adversary could to exploit the information obtained from participating in the simulation, to
determine a unique α2 that is consistent with the received values.
We claim, however, that no adversary can do better than that. This is because, during the simulation, the Sid value
is computed from zi and h only and does not involve any e-root extraction; i.e., even though the simulation depends
on the value α2 induced by the parameters chosen by the simulator, it does not reveal the actual value of α, apart from
what is revealed by the value α2 itself. In other words the entire simulation is s information-theoretically independent
from the specific square root of α2 originally chosen by the simulator. Thus, even a computationally unbounded
adversary cannot guess the exact value of α with probability better than 1/2.
Now let Sig(m j ) = (z j , y j1 , j1, . . . , y jd , jd) be the forgery produced by the adversary on a (up to now) unsigned
message m j . Since we are assuming the adversary creates a Type I forgery, for some previously produced signature
Sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id) we have that y jk = yik for each k = 1, . . . , d but z j 6= zi .
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This yields to the following system of equations:
(z j )e = SidhH(m j ) mod N
(zi )e = Sid hH(mi ) mod N .
Moreover, since H is collision resistant mi 6= m j implies that H(mi ) 6= H(m j ) and we can write H(mi ) −
H(m j ) = 2ωg for some ω ≤ ` and an odd g ≥ 1 (we assume w.l.o.g. that H(mi ) − H(m j ) > 0, otherwise one can
simply switch zi and z j ) .
From the two equations above we can compute(
z j
zi
)e
= (hg)2ω mod N = (αgF/2)2ω+1 mod N .
Recall now that e = 2`+1 , giving us
(
z j
zi
)2`+1−ω
= hg mod N .
Now, hg has two square roots, of which we already know one: αgF/2. From the above equation we obtain (z j z−1i )2
`−ω
as also a square root of hg . Note that `− ω ≥ 0 so we can easily compute the value without computing square-roots.
As discussed before, observe that the adversary has no information at all regarding the original α chosen by the
simulator (in an information theoretic sense). Consequently the value (z j z−1i )2
`−ω
is a square root of hg that is different
from αgF/2 with probability 1/2. This immediately allows to factor the modulus.
Forgery of type II. The algorithm B is given as input a Blum modulus N of the appropriate form together with a set
of l small primes (ρ1, . . . ρl ) such that for every ρi one has that ρi |λ(N ) but ρ2i 6 |λ(N ).
The simulator starts generating the signing public key by choosing a random index 1 ≤ δ ≤ l. This random choice
can be interpreted as the simulator “guessing” the value of jk′+1, the index of the first child where the forgery and the
regular signature path of the tree will differ.
Next it creates the public exponents e, e1, . . . el as prescribed by the key generation algorithm. Then it chooses a
random element α ∈ Z∗N , computes G = e · e1 · · · eδ−1 · ρδ · eδ+1 · · · el and sets h = αG mod N .
The simulation proceeds by letting B precompute the authentication tree in order to be able to produce t valid
signatures. This precomputation phase behaves very similarly to the one described before. The main difference here
is that the root and the internal nodes of the tree are computed in a bottom-up fashion (rather than top-down, as for
the forgeries of type one).
For each node Sid (nodes of depth d) the simulator chooses a random element xid and sets Sid = xGid mod N . Once
the nodes of level d are prepared, one can construct the expanding nodes, item by item.
Here, for simplicity, we show the method for a generic item I . The basic idea is to construct the parent node SI0 in
terms of its δth child SIδ . In particular the simulator chooses a random value x I ∈ Z∗N , sets
SI0 = xG·ρ
`δ−1
δ
I h
−H(SIδ ) mod N
and stores the values SI0 and x I (in the following, for each item I , we will refer to x I as to the basis of SI0 ).
Using this methodology the simulator can (inductively) generate the entire tree. Each new level is obtained by
combining the items of the previous level in a tree structure (the roots of the items of level k play the role of the leaves
to construct the items of level k − 1). At the end of this phase the simulator comes up with a global root S, which is
included as part of the public key.
On top of this construction to sign the message mi , the simulator does as follows. First he computes the path
(i1, . . . , id) from the root to the i th leaf of the tree. Then he proceeds as follows:
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for k = 1 to d
Assume Sik is the bth child of Sik−1
Let xik be the basis of Sik−1
if b == δ
Set yik = xG/ρδik
if b 6= δ
Set yik = xG/eb·ρ
`δ−1
δ
ik · (αG/eb )H(Sik )
Set zi = xG/eid (αG/e)H(mi )
Output the signature Sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id).
In other words, the adversary easily computes e-roots and ei -roots (for i 6= δ) because all the values are G-residues
and he knows G-roots of them. For the case i = δ it is not necessary to compute eδ-roots owing to the way in which
the internal nodes have been prepared.
If the adversary produces a valid forgery Sig(m j ) = (z j , y j1 , j1, . . . , y jd , jd), one can “use” it to break
Assumption 1 as follows. Since we are dealing with a forgery of the second type, there exists an index k (such that
1 ≤ k ≤ d) for which one has that Sik−1 = S jk−1 but yik 6= y jk . Moreover, since B simulates a real signer perfectly,
with probability 1/ l one has that S jk is the δth child of S jk−1 . If this is the case we can then consider the following
equations:
yeδjk = Sik−1hH(S jk ) mod N
yeδik = Sik−1hH(Sik ) mod N
which dividing term by term become
Y eδ = h1H mod N
where we set Y = (y jk/yik ) and 1H = H(S jk )− H(Sik ).
Once again since H is collision resistant, from the fact that S jk 6= Sik we can assume that 1H 6= 0. Therefore we
can write 1H = ρωδ g with g ≥ 1, such that gcd(g, ρδ) = 1. Moreover ω < `δ , because of the way we chose `δ .
The above equation can then be rewritten as
Y ρ
`δ
δ =
(
α
gG
ρδ
)ρω+1δ
mod N
which implies that the value Z = Y ρ`δ−ω−1δ is an ρδ root of hg .
Now, by an argument actually identical in respect of that given for forgeries of type I, we have that the received ρδ
is different with respect to α
gG
ρδ with probability 1−1/ρδ . Again note that `δ−ω−1 ≥ 0 so the value Z can be easily
computed without computing ρδ-roots.
6. Security analysis
In this section we discuss in greater detail our intractability assumption and, in particular, we give some evidence
why assuming N  σ 4 seems to be safe. We point out that the following analysis was already presented in [21]. We
report it here for the sole sake of completeness. If σ was unknown, all the efficient factoring methods known (such as
the Quadratic Sieve or the Number Field Sieve) do not seem to gain any advantage from the additional information
that it divides λ(N ). The problem, however, is that, in our case, σ is explicitly given to the adversary. This fact already
imposes some restrictions on the size of σ . In fact, one is given
4p′q ′ = φ(N )
σ
= N
σ
− p + q − 1
σ
.
Thus the unknown quantity 4p′q ′ differs by the known one N/σ by the fraction − p+q−1
σ
. Note that p + q − 1 is
an |N |/2 bits integer and then, if it is not sufficiently larger than σ , the integer 4p′q ′ becomes easily computable.
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An additional difficulty comes from the fact that our scheme needs to disclose the factorization of σ . Reducing N
modulo qˆ and modulo pˆ one obtains the following equations
c = q ′ mod pˆ
d = p′ mod qˆ
which can be rewritten, over the integers, as q ′ = c + r pˆ and p′ = d + sqˆ, for unknown s and r . This means that
N = (2 pˆ(d + sqˆ)+ 1)(2qˆ(c + r pˆ)+ 1)
which becomes
N = 4rsσ 2 + 2σ(r(2d pˆ + 1)+ s(2cqˆ + 1)+ 2(cqˆ + d pˆ + 2σdc)+ 1.
Denoting α = 2d pˆ + 1, β = 2cqˆ + 1 and γ = 2(cqˆ + d pˆ + 2σdc)+ 1 one has
N = 4rsσ 2 + 2σ(αr + βs)+ γ (5)
where α, β ≤ 2σ and γ ≤ 4σ 2 are known quantities. Reducing Eq. (5) modulo σ 2 one has the value a =
αr + βs mod σ . It is easy to check that the pair (r, s) lies in the two-dimensional lattice L defined by L =
{(x, y) | αx + βy = a mod σ } and having determinant σ .
Let us now focus on the specific point (r, s). From the (known) bounds on α, β and γ one has that
rs ≤ N
4σ 2
≤ (r + 1)(s + 1).
This means that the point (r, s) is actually very close to the boundary of the curve having equation xy = N4σ 2 (in
particular the distance between (r, s) and the boundary cannot be bigger than
√
2). This allows a geometric area A
that includes (r, s) to be defined. In [21] Naccache and Stern argue that the size of this area can be approximated by
O(
√
N
σ
).
The number of points in A that are in L can be measured by dividing the size of A by the determinant of the lattice.
This leads to a set S having estimated size O(
√
N
σ 2
). Thus, in order to make exhaustive search in S infeasible, one
should set N  σ 4.
7. Performance of the scheme
In our scheme we have the length of the signature as about dn where d = logl K , where K is the bound on the
number of signatures.
Let us now analyze the computation time. At each level of the tree, we need to compute one exponentiation to an `
bit exponent (to compute hH(·)) and then an ei -root which is more or less equivalent to a full exponentiation mod N .
Thus the worst-case complexity3 for computing a signature is 1.5d(`+ n) multiplications.
However, since not all signatures require the full computation of the path, one can consider the amortized cost (in
which the cost of computing all ld signatures is divided by ld ). To compute the amortized complexity in our scheme,
we observe that the cost of one basic authentication step is 1.5(` + n) multiplications. Then we have to multiply
this cost by l
d+1
l−1 (the number of nodes) and divide by l
d (the total number of signatures). The net result is that the
amortized complexity is roughly 1.5(`+ n) multiplications.
To verify a signature we need to compute two exponentiations with ` bit exponents at each level, therefore about
3`d total multiplications.
Concerning the storage required for the signer, let (S, i1, Si1 , yi1 . . . , id , Sid , yid ) be the authentication path
corresponding to the i th signature. Note that this is all the signer needs to maintain in order to produce correctly
3 Note that, when computing a signature, the signer is not always required to compute every authentication path (from the root to a leaf) from
scratch. This is because the i th signature is computed by adding a path (to the i th leaf) to the existing tree. This means that, assuming that the signer
stores the authentication path of the i − 1th generated signature, all he has to do to produce the i th signature is to compute the levels for which
the i th and the i − 1th paths differ. For this reason, the worst-case complexity measurement considered here refers to the number of authentication
steps the signer is required to compute (and not to the number of multiplications required to perform each single authentication).
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the i + 1th signature. In other words, the part of the tree to the left of the above-mentioned path can be deleted.
Moreover, since S is part of the public key and the couple (Sid , yid ) will not be used as part of new signatures, the
entire storage requirement can be reduced to the 3(d − 1)-uple (i1, Si1 , yi1 . . . , id−1, Sid−1 , yid−1). This amounts to
(d − 1)(2n + log l) bits.
PRACTICAL PARAMETERS. In practice we can assume that n = 1024, l = 16 and ` = 160. Note that, letting σ be
the product of the first 16 primes, one has the resulting integer as less than 85 bits long, which is consistent with the
security requirement that N has to be much larger than σ 4 (see Section 6). Moreover, if one wants to sign up to 280
messages, the above parameters induce d = 20.
By these positions, the length of each signature is (roughly) 21 600 bits (plus the size of the message). Signing a
message costs, on average, less than 1800 modular multiplications while verifying a given signature costs (roughly)
9600 multiplications.
7.1. Comparison with GMR
In [18] Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest proposed the first example of a digital signature scheme secure against an
adaptive chosen message attack. The scheme relies on the existence of claw free permutations, but the authors propose
a concrete implementation based on the hardness of factoring. The reader is referred to [18] for the technical details;
here we compare the practical performance of our scheme with that presented in [18].
Their scheme is based on a binary tree. As we mentioned before, the depth of the tree is dˆ = log K . Let us denote
with δ > 1 the ratio dˆ/d .
The length of the signature is about 2dˆn bits, i.e. 2n bits per level of the tree. Note that this is a factor of 2δ longer
than our signatures.
The basic authentication step, performed at each level of the tree, consists of taking repeated square roots. In the
original scheme in [18] the number of square roots taken at each level is about 2n, where n is the length of the
modulus. This happens because the number of square roots taken is proportional to the length of the information
being authenticated. However, to obtain a fair comparison with our scheme, we should improve the scheme in [18]
by introducing a separate collision-resistant hash function H , as we did in our scheme. If one hashes the information
at each step, before applying the authentication step, we reduce the work to 2` square-root computations per level
of the tree. By using the speed-up trick suggested by Goldreich (cf. Section 10.2 of [18]) this is equivalent to one
exponentiation with an ` bit exponent, and one full exponentiation mod N , per level of the tree, i.e. roughly 1.5(`+n)
multiplications. Thus the worst-case cost of computing a signature is 1.5dˆ(`+ n) multiplications, which is a factor δ
slower than ours.
To compute the amortized complexity of signatures in [18] we need to multiply the cost of the basic authentication
step, by 2dˆ (the number of nodes divided by two)4 and then divide by 2dˆ (the number of signatures). The net result is
that the amortized cost is 1.5(`+ n) multiplications per signature, the same as ours.
Similarly the verification of a signature requires the computation of about 2` squarings at each level of the tree, for
a total of 2`dˆ multiplications. Verification in [18] is thus a factor of 2δ/3 slower than in ours.
Let us consider a specific example in which n = 1024, dˆ = 80, l = 16 (i.e. d = 20) and ` = 160. Again, this
allows generation of up to 280 different signatures. In this case δ = 4 and we immediately obtain that our signatures
are a factor of 8 shorter than those in [18]. The worst-case complexity of computing a signature is also four times
smaller in our scheme, while the amortized complexity is the same. Finally, verification time is about three times
faster in our scheme.
7.2. Comparison with Cramer–Damga˚rd
It is not hard to see that our scheme is very similar to the scheme proposed by Cramer and Damga˚rd in [10]. Thus
the efficiency of our scheme is identical to that of the scheme proposed there, while relying on a seemingly weaker
assumption.
4 This is because a basic authentication step in [18] requires to authenticate an entire (binary) item.
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8. A hash-free variant
In this section we describe a variant of our scheme that can be proved secure under the sole hypothesis that
Assumption 1 holds. This scheme is less efficient than that described in Section 3, and is presented here for theoretical
interest only.
A detailed description of the scheme follows.
KEY GENERATION. The signer chooses l odd distinct primes5 ρi < 2v (for some small enough parameter v) and sets
pˆ = ∏l/2i=1 ρi , qˆ = ∏li=l/2+1 ρi and σ = pˆqˆ . He then randomly picks two (distinct) large primes p′ and q ′ of length
k/2 such that p = 2p′ pˆ + 1 and q = 2q ′qˆ + 1 are two (k + ω)/2-bit primes (for some parameter ω that depends on
v and l). Then he sets N = pq as the public modulus.
LetM be the message space we assume that ∀m ∈M one has that |m| < ζ for some parameter ζ (we assume that
the key generation algorithm receives ζ as one of its inputs).
Denote with E = 2σ = 2ρ1 · · · ρl . The signer chooses uniformly and at random two E th residues h, S in Z∗N . The
signer sets e = 2`, for some parameter ` > max{|N |, ζ } and for each i = 1, . . . , l sets ei = ρ`ii , where `i is the
minimum integer such that |ei | > |N |.
The signer publishes (N , h, S, e, e1, . . . , el , d), where d represents the depth of the tree, as his public key and
keeps private the factorization of the modulus. As for the basic scheme, note that this allows the signer to sign up to
ld messages.
SIGNATURE ALGORITHM. The signer holds a tree of depth d with root S. All the nodes in the tree at the beginning
are empty.
To sign the i th message mi the signer proceeds as follows:
1. He visits the path on the tree from the root to the i th leaf, which is labeled with mi . If a node j on this path has not
been visited before, the signer labels it with a random E-residue S j .
2. Let (S, i1, Si1 , . . . , id , Sid ) be the visited path (where each i j is an index in {1, . . . , l}). Then he solves (for the
appropriate yik , where k = 1, . . . , d) the following equations
y
ei1
i1
= S · hSi1 mod N
and for all j = 2, . . . , d
y
ei j
i j = Si j−1 · h
Si j mod N .
To conclude the signature he computes a zi such that
zei = Sid · hmi mod N .
3. The output signature on mi is sig(mi ) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id).
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION. The receiver, given a message m, the public key (N , h, S, e, e1, . . . , el , d) and a
purported signature sig(m) = (zi , yi1 , i1, . . . , yid , id), computes the following
Sid = zei · h−mi mod N
followed by
Si j−1 = y
ei j
i j · h
−Si j mod N
for all j = d downto 1.
If the final value S0 ≡ S mod N the signature is accepted as valid.
The security of the scheme is guaranteed by the following theorem.
5 As before, the choice of these primes needs not satisfy any special requirement (except, again, that this choice must guarantee that factoring
the modulus remains hard). For efficiency reasons these primes could be chosen as the first l odd primes.
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Theorem 2. If Assumption 1 holds then the digital signature scheme presented above is secure against an adaptive
chosen message attack.
The proof goes very similarly to that of Theorem 1 and, mutatis mutandi, one could easily derive it from that given
in Section 5.
Remark 4. We point out that the values S j ’s are chosen in Z∗N but then used as exponents. This is clearly not a
problem as we simply consider them as integers. In the proof of security, the important thing is that the exponents ei ’s
are larger integers than the S j ’s which is true by the way that exponent ei ’s are defined.
9. Conclusions
We presented a new and efficient signature scheme, which is provably secure against adaptive chosen message
attack under the assumption that factoring large composites of a certain form is infeasible.
Our scheme shows that the “flat-tree” approach can lead also to efficient signatures under a factoring assumption,
while previous proposals relied either on the seemingly stronger RSA Assumption or were less efficient.
In terms of efficiency our scheme is equivalent to the RSA-based scheme presented in [10], and much better than
the factoring-based ones in [18] and in [8].
For further reading
[9,20,24]
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Appendix. Efficient root extractions
With the following lemma we show a simple method (taking advantage of the fact that the ρi ’s are all odd primes)
to extract ρi -roots in a (asymptotically) more efficient way.
Lemma 3. Let p be a Blum prime of size k. Let e be a prime such that e|p − 1 but e2 6 |p − 1. Then there exists an
efficient algorithm, taking as input an e-residue a, that returns as output an e-root of a in time O(k3).
Proof. First note that the prime p can be written as p = 2em + 1 where m is an odd integer such that gcd(e,m) = 1.
Since a is an e-residue in Z∗p it must be true that
a
p−1
e ≡ 1 mod p.
Now let B such that p−1e + B = Ae for some A over the integers. The equation above can then be rewritten as
a
p−1
e · aB ≡ aAe mod p
or better
aAe ≡ aB mod p.
Furthermore observe that since gcd(2m, e) = 1 it has to be the case that gcd(B, e) = 1. This means that, using the
extended Euclidean algorithm, it is possible to compute two values λ and µ such that λB + µe = 1 over the integers.
Thus the equation above becomes
aλB+µe ≡ (aA)eλ · aµe mod p
and then
a ≡ (aAλ+µ)e mod p.
Thus aAλ+µ is an e-root of a.
The cost of the described method is dominated by the cost of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm which requires
O(k3) bit operations.
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